30 April 2009

Mauritius: Developing Projects Through Private And Public Finance

A series of workshops to promote development projects built by private and public sector finance and expertise have been held in Mauritius.

The latest three-day workshop on Public Private Partnerships (PPP), organised by the Mauritius PPP committee and the Commonwealth Secretariat between 7 and 9 April, looked at how the private sector could work with the government on development projects. It was attended by over 50 senior officials from various ministries, academic and state-owned enterprises.

The Minister of Public Infrastructure, Land Transport and Shipping in Mauritius, the Hon A. K. Bachoo, said: "Massive investment is required to meet the growing demand for infrastructure the world over.

What are Public Private Partnerships?

· PPP projects are when the private sector works with public bodies to provide investment or services for developments.

· PPP's have been used in Britain, Canada, India, Malaysia, Australia, and in the South African Development Community region on projects including power generation, water and sanitation, prisons, hospitals, stadiums and housing.

· The total revenues worldwide from PPP's in 2007 amounted to US $ 1.4 billion - ref Public Works Financing, March 2008.

"The partnership between government and the private sector has, in many countries, helped in mobilising the necessary resources to accelerate the implementation of infrastructure projects, and also in improving the quality of services offered to the public."

Two other workshops have also been held and were attended by the Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers, permanent secretaries, mayors, local councillors, senior local government officials, and representatives from the Mauritian private sector.

They were delivered by the Secretariat's PPP Adviser, Mr Hee Kong Yong and Associate Professor Dr Michael Regan of Bond University, Australia.

Lead Analyst of the Mauritius PPP Unit, Visvanaden Soondram said: "The workshops were useful in creating awareness of the PPP initiative. The participants will be able to apply what they have learned on the course to practical situations.

"We will make sure that whatever the techniques, concepts or the best practice, whatever has been disseminated through the workshop when developing PPP projects progresses the initiatives."

Deputy Director of Procurement and Supply at the Procurement Policy Office, Arnd Mudhoo, said: "The workshops were important because many public officers may have heard of PPP and they know how it can be used but they have not been exposed to real cases. Now we know what are the risks, the opportunities and how we have to deal with situations."

External Finance for Emerging Markets 2009

The ability of developing countries to access external finance has a crucial role in their economic development. IFSL’s annual report External Finance for Emerging Economies sets out the extent of external financing from commercial sources including foreign direct and portfolio investment and bank lending. The 2009 edition showed that such inflows dropped an estimated 70% to $843bn in 2008.


29 April 2009

Assessing the Effectiveness of Enforcement and Regulation

The City of London Corporation, the London Investment Banking Association (LIBA), the International Capital Market Association (ICMA), the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) and the Futures and Options Association (FOA) have commissioned a piece of research with the aim of contributing to the current debate on the effectiveness of enforcement and capital market regulation in different countries.

Both recent and ongoing developments in capital markets stemming from the current crisis, and moves by some regulatory authorities to consider mutual recognition of comparable regulatory regimes form the background to this project. The former brings to light market and regulatory failures that have engendered a fundamental review of the approach taken to the regulation of capital markets; the latter brings the challenge that regulatory authorities, interested in reaching mutual recognition agreements, need to assess other regimes on the basis that they deliver broad equivalence in terms of outcomes, and to avoid defaulting to measures of regulatory inputs. The purpose of this study is to help to shape the debate on these two issues.

New report from the City of London Assessing the Effectiveness of Enforcement and Regulation

New research published today by the City of London Corporation identifies wide differences in the effectiveness of enforcement and capital markets regulation between developing and developed countries. The current crisis exposes the serious gaps in regulation in the most developed economies, however this report finds that regulatory effectiveness, measured in terms of market outcomes, is comparable among all the developed economies assessed, despite quite different approaches to regulation. No single one of these economies comes out ahead in all measures. The study looks at outcomes such as the cost of equity, size and liquidity of markets, valuation premiums, listings and market cleanliness to evaluate the effectiveness of regulation in the UK, US, France, Germany and Australia.

"Assessing the Effectiveness of Enforcement and Regulation" was commissioned by the City of London Corporation in conjunction with the London Investment Banking Association (LIBA), the International Capital Market Association (ICMA), the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) and the Futures and Options Association (FOA). It was produced by CRA International.

Stuart Fraser, Chairman of Policy of the City of London Corporation, said:

"This report is particularly timely as the world’s leading economies look for ways to harmonise global financial regulation. It shows that we must focus on improving regulatory outcomes rather than getting tied up in the nuances of the regulatory regime. There is no point in regulating for the sake of it."

Seminar on Islamic Capital Markets Mauritius

Mauritius will host the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) Seminar on Islamic Capital Markets from 19 - 20 May 2009. The event, which is being jointly organised by the IFSB, the Bank of Mauritius (BoM) and the Financial Services Commission (FSC) of Mauritius aims at enhancing awareness on the Islamic capital market and its role in the Islamic financial services industry.

By hosting this event, Mauritius aims at promoting the implementation of Islamic financial services in the country. This initiative underlines the full support of Mauritius in promoting the works of the IFSB. The event will help in positioning Mauritius as an international financial centre with a strong value proposition for Islamic financial services and will give an additional edge to tap new business avenues outside the country.

About the Islamic Financial Services Board

The Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), which is based in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, was officially inaugurated on 3rd November 2002 and started operations on 10th March 2003. It serves as an international standard setting body of regulatory and supervisory agencies that have vested interest in ensuring the soundness and stability of the Islamic financial services industry, which is defined broadly to include banking, capital market and insurance. In advancing this mission, the IFSB promotes the development of a prudent and transparent Islamic financial services industry through introducing new, or adapting existing international standards consistent with Shari'ah principles, and recommend them for adoption. To this end, the work of the IFSB complements that of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Organisation of Securities Commissions and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors.

The members of the IFSB include regulatory and supervisory authorities, international inter-governmental organisations (International Monetary Fund, The World Bank, Bank for International Settlements, Islamic Development Bank, Asian Development Bank) and market players from various countries.

Malaysia, the host country of the IFSB, has enacted a law known as the Islamic Financial Services Board Act 2002, which gives the IFSB the immunities and privileges that are usually granted to international organisations and diplomatic missions.

Adoption of standards

Since its inception, the IFSB has issued nine standards, guiding principles and technical note for the Islamic financial services industry focusing on Risk Management, Capital Adequacy, Corporate Governance, Supervisory Review Process, Transparency and Market Discipline, Recognition of Ratings on Shari`ah-Compliant Financial Instruments, Development of Islamic Money Markets, Special Issues in Capital Adequacy Requirements for Sukuk and Real Estate, as well as Governance for Collective Investment Schemes. The IFSB is working on new standards and guidelines on (1) Corporate Governance in Takaful Operations; (2) Shari`ah Governance and (3) Conduct of Business. The standards prepared by the IFSB follow a lengthy due process as outlined in its Guidelines and Procedures for the Preparation of Standards/ Guidelines which involve, among others, the issuance of exposure draft and, where necessary, the holding of a public hearing.

Awareness promotion

The IFSB is actively involved in the promotion of awareness of issues that are relevant or have an impact on the regulation and supervision of the Islamic financial services industry. This mainly takes the form of international conferences, seminars, workshops, trainings, meetings and dialogues staged in many countries.

For more information on IFSB, please visit http://www.ifsb.org


About the Bank of Mauritius

The Bank of Mauritius (BoM) is the central bank of Mauritius. Our principal role as defined in the Bank of Mauritius Act 2004 is to maintain price stability and to promote orderly and balanced economic development.

Functions of the BoM
  • to conduct monetary policy and manage the exchange rate of the rupee, taking into account the orderly and balanced economic development of Mauritius;
  • to regulate and supervise financial institutions carrying on activities in, or from within, Mauritius;
  • to manage, in collaboration with other relevant supervisory and regulatory bodies, the clearing, payment and settlement systems of Mauritius;
  • to collect, compile, disseminate, on a timely basis, monetary and related financial statistics;
  • to issue Mauritian currency notes and coins;
  • to manage the foreign exchange reserves of Mauritius;
  • to ascertain and promote the soundness of financial institutions and their compliance with governing laws, rules and regulations;
  • to adopt policies to safeguard the rights and interests of depositors and creditors of financial institutions, having due regard to the need for financial institutions to compete effectively in the market and take reasonable risks; and
  • to act as the Banker to banks and to the Government.
History of BoM

The Bill for the establishment of the Bank of Mauritius as the central bank was passed by the Legislative Assembly on 26 July 1966. It received the assent of the Governor-General on 28 September 1966 and became an Act when it was gazetted on 15 October 1966. The first Directors of the Board of the Bank were appointed in July 1967 and the Bank of Mauritius started its operations in August 1967. The Act of 1966 witnessed many changes over time until the year 2004 when it was repealed and replaced by a new Bank of Mauritius Act 2004.

Recent Developments

Since the establishment of the BoM, the financial system in Mauritius has become increasingly sophisticated. Exchange control was completely abolished in July 1994. The exchange rate of the rupee is now freely determined by market forces. Interest rates are determined on the market as well and direct credit control is no longer an instrument of monetary control. The Bank of Mauritius has thus moved to an indirect method of monetary control. As a legal requirement, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) was formally launched on 23rd April 2007. In August 2007, The Bank of Mauritius Act 2004 was amended to empower the MPC to independently formulate and determine the monetary policy of the Bank.

Responding to changes in the financial services industry, the BoM and the Financial Services Commission (FSC) formalised their collaboration and co-operation through the signature of a Protocole d’Accord and the setting up of a Joint BOM/FSC Co-ordination Committee. This closer collaboration will further serve to enhance the stability of the financial system in Mauritius. The BoM is also committed to setting up the necessary framework for the conduct of Islamic Banking, which is one of the world’s fastest growing financial segments.

For more information on BoM, please visit http://bom.intnet.mu/


Financial Services Commission

Vision Statement

To be an internationally recognised financial supervisor committed to the sustained development of Mauritius as a sound and competitive Financial Services Centre

Mission statement

In carrying its mission, the Financial Services Commission (FSC) aims:
  • To promote the development, fairness, efficiency and transparency of financial institutions and capital markets in Mauritius.
  • To suppress crime and malpractices so as to provide protection to members of the public investing in non bank financial products.
  • To ensure the soundness and stability of the financial system in Mauritius for the benefit of the economy.
Corporate profile

The Financial Services Commission (FSC) is the integrated regulator for global business and financial services other than banking in Mauritius. The Commission was established in 2001 and it operates under the Financial Services Act 2007 to license, regulate, monitor and supervise the conduct of business activities in these sectors.

The main objective of the Commission is to foster a sound environment conducive to business and to safeguard the integrity of Mauritius as an International Financial Centre (IFC). Whilst creating a favourable environment for the development of financial businesses, the Commission aims to position Mauritius as a strong IFC, built on the premise of good reputation, sustained credibility and substance. The FSC also focuses on the protection of consumers by promoting public understanding of financial services and products.

The FSC’s regulatory mandate covers credit services, securities, collective investment funds, custody and trust services, commodities futures trading, Islamic finance, insurance and pension funds, global business as well as an international commodities derivatives exchange.

Regulatory Approach

The regulatory framework in place, enhanced by the coming into force of a new set of legislations (Financial Services Act 2007, Securities Act 2005, Insurance Act 2005), rules and regulations in 2007, reflect the norms adopted by international standard-setting bodies, such as the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), the Financial Action Task Force, the Basel Committee, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. International regulatory standards foster good governance and encourage best practice.

Hence, the FSC also applies necessary procedures relating to anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism through the relevant Codes issued thereby reducing the risk of financial crime.

The Commission is responsible for undertaking compliance and inspection visits to all licensees at frequencies determined according to the risk profile of each licensed entity.
The Commission ensures compliance in the sector through regular on-site inspection to all licensees. With the coming into operation of the Risk-Based Supervision Framework, the frequencies of inspections will be determined according to the risk profile of each licensed entity. The RBS system assesses each licensee for the risk it poses to the attainment of the statutory objectives of FSC.

The FSC also focuses on the protection of consumers by promoting public understanding of non-bank financial services and products, thereby reducing the risks of financial crime and market abuse.

Moreover, the Commission promotes a business friendly approach – underpinned by close collaboration with all stakeholders within its regulatory supervision.

For more information on Financial Services Commission, please visit http://www.fscmauritius.org/

Financial services: Commission proposes EU framework for managers of alternative investment funds

The European Commission has proposed a Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFM). The proposed Directive is an important part of the European Commission's response to the financial crisis, as set out in the Communication on Driving European Recovery. It aims to create a comprehensive and effective regulatory and supervisory framework for AIFM in the European Union. AIFM, which include the managers of hedge funds and private equity funds, managed around €2 trillion in assets at the end of 2008. This is the first attempt in any jurisdiction to create a comprehensive framework for the direct regulation and supervision in the alternative fund industry. The proposal now passes to the European Parliament and Council for consideration.

Internal Market and Services Commissioner Charlie McCreevy said: "Alternative investement fund managers have become important participants in the European financial system and their activities have had a significant impact on the markets and companies in which they invest. There is now a global consensus – as expressed by the G20 leaders – over the need for closer regulatory engagement with this sector. In particular, it is essential that regulators have the information and tools necessary to conduct effective macro-prudential oversight. The crisis has also underscored the importance of robust risk and liquidity management systems and the need for reliable investor information as the basis for effective due diligence. I look forward to working with the European Parliament and Council to secure the adoption of this important piece of legislation."

The proposed Directive will require all AIFM within scope to be authorised and to be subject to harmonised regulatory standards on an ongoing basis. It will also enhance the transparency of the activities of AIFM and the funds they manage towards investors and public authorities. This will enable Member States to improve the macro-prudential oversight of the sector and to take coordinated action as necessary to ensure the proper functioning of financial markets. The proposal will help to overcome gaps and inconsistencies in existing regulatory frameworks at national level and will provide a secure basis for the development of the internal market.

The proposed AIFM Directive will:
  • Adopt an 'all encompassing' approach so as to ensure that no significant AIFM escapes effective regulation and oversight, while recognising the legitimate differences in existing business models and providing exemptions for smaller managers for whom the requirements would be disproportionate. Therefore, the Directive will only apply to those AIFM managing a portfolio of more than 100 million euros. A higher threshold of 500 million applies to AIFM not using leverage (and having a five years lock-in period for their investors) as they are not regarded as posing systemic risks. A threshold of € 100 million implies that roughly 30% of hedge fund managers, managing almost 90% of assets of EU domiciled hedge funds, would be covered by the Directive.
  • Regulate all major sources of risks in the alternative investment value chain by ensuring that AIFM are authorised and subject to ongoing regulation and that key service providers, including depositaries and administrators, are subject to robust regulatory standards.
  • Enhance the transparency of AIFM and the funds they manage towards supervisors, investors and other key stakeholders.
  • Ensure that all regulated entities are subject to appropriate governance standards and have robust systems in place for the management of risks, liquidity and conflicts of interest.
  • Permit AIFM to market funds to professional investors throughout the EU subject to compliance with demanding regulatory standards.
  • Grant access to the European market to third country funds after a transitional period of three years. This should allow the EU to check whether the necessary guarantees are in place in the countries where the funds are domiciled (equivalence of regulatory and supervisory standards, exchange of information on tax matters).
Background

In the EU, investment funds can be broadly categorised as UCITS (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities) and non-UCITS (or non-harmonised) funds. The former are those that comply with the harmonised rules laid down in the UCITS Directive (85/611/EEC) and are authorised for sale to the retail market. For the purposes of the proposed Directive, Alternative Investment Funds (AIF) are defined as all funds that are not harmonised under the UCITS Directive.

The AIFM sector in the EU is large, with around €2 trillion in assets at the end of 2008. It is also diverse: hedge funds, private equity funds, commodity funds, real estate funds and infrastructure funds, among others, all fall within this category. They invest in a wide range of assets and employ different investment strategies and techniques. AIF invest in financial instruments such as stocks, bonds and other securities or commodities, as well as shares in real estate and infrastructure projects and controlling stakes in companies.

Investments in AIF are typically regarded as entailing a level of risk or other characteristics that render them unsuitable for retail investors. Access to many types of AIF has therefore traditionally been restricted to professional or institutional investors.

The activities of AIFM are currently regulated by a combination of Member State financial and company law regulation, as well as cross-cutting provisions of Community law. These laws have been supplemented in some sectors by industry-developed standards. However, recent events have demonstrated that the activities of AIFM are not sufficiently transparent and that the associated risks are not sufficiently addressed by current regulatory and supervisory arrangements. Crucially, the existing regulatory environment does not adequately reflect the cross-border nature of the risks posed: the impact of risks crystallising in the AIFM sector in one Member State will therefore also be felt beyond its national borders.

In recognition of these vulnerabilities, the European Commission, in the recent Communication to the Spring European Council on Driving European Recovery, committed to ensuring that all relevant market actors are subject to appropriate regulation and oversight and specifically to introducing a harmonised regulatory and supervisory framework for the alternative investment sector.

More information is available at:



28 April 2009

Taxation and Good governance: The European Commission proposes actions to improve transparency, exchange of information and fair tax competition

The European Commission today has adopted a Communication identifying actions that EU Member States should take to promote "good governance" in the tax area (i.e. more transparency, exchange of information and fair tax competition).

The Communication identifies how good governance could be improved within the EU. It also lists the tools the EU and its Member States have at their disposal to ensure that good governance principles are applied at international level. Finally, it calls on Member States to adopt an approach that is more coherent with good governance principles in their bilateral relations with third countries and in international fora. The Communication builds on the existing EU policy on good governance and the recent G20 conclusions concerning uncooperative tax jurisdictions.

László Kovács, Commissioner for Taxation and Customs, said: ”EU Member States cannot afford to act alone when designing policies to prevent their tax revenues disappearing to tax havens or non cooperative jurisdictions If they do not cooperate with each other, including in international fora, their actions to protect their revenues will not produce effective results'

Improve good governance within the EU

Improving good governance within the EU would reinforce the argument for other jurisdictions to take similar steps.

The Commission therefore calls on the Member States of the Union to adopt as soon as possible its recent proposals to:

  • Ensure effective administrative cooperation in the assessment of taxes which would, in particular, prohibit Member States in future from invoking bank secrecy laws as a justification for not assisting the tax authorities of other Member States (IP/09/201);
  • Ensure administrative cooperation in the recovery of tax claims;
  • Improve the functioning of the Savings Tax Directive (IP/08/1697). There is a need to extend the scope of the Directive to intermediate tax-exempted structures (trust, foundations...) and to income equivalent to interest obtained through investments in some innovative financial products.

The Commission also calls on Member States to continue the work to eliminate harmful business tax measures under the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation.

Promote good governance in the relations with third countries

The European Commission proposes to improve the particular tools that the European Community and EU Member States may have at their disposal to promote good governance internationally:

  • it identifies ways to ensure better coherence between EU policies in general, so that EU partners would commit to good governance principles. This includes enhancing good governance principles in relevant EU-level agreements with third countries as well as through development cooperation incentives;
  • it calls on the EU Member States to adopt a coordinated and coherent approach in the promotion of good governance principles towards third countries, including, where appropriate, coordinated action against jurisdictions that refuse to apply good governance principles.

Some of the concrete actions proposed are:

  • To invite the Council to give the appropriate political priority to the mandate given to the Commission to include good governance principles in relevant EU agreements with third countries.;
  • To discuss with Member States possible counter-measures towards non cooperative jurisdictions in the tax area (the OECD Secretariat has suggested a list of measures. These will need to be examined together with the Member States);
  • To promote more cooperation with third countries in the framework of the Savings Tax Directive;
  • To conclude specific agreements in the tax area containing, if appropriate, provisions on transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes at EU level to accelerate the process of implementing commitments to greater transparency and exchange of information made by certain jurisdictions;
  • To consider a reallocation of funds towards developing countries that are implementing satisfactorily their commitments; and, conversely, considering a cancellation of funds earmarked for those countries that did not implement their commitments;
  • More coherence between Member States' own bilateral tax policies towards third countries and the principles of good governance in the tax area.

Background

With the financial crisis, the need for national governments to safeguard their tax revenues is more acute than ever.

The need to promote international tax cooperation and common standards has now become a regular item on the agenda of discussions, both within the EU and in international fora. Most recently, the G20 Leaders agreed at their summit in London (April 2, 2009), "to take action against non-cooperative jurisdictions, including tax havens".

The Commission's present Communication is a response to the questions raised at international level placed firmly in the EU context of its overall policy on good governance in tax matters.

The texts of the proposals are available at this web link:
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/index_en.htm

Further information on the strategy to improve anti-fraud measures can be found at:
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/tax_cooperation/gen_overview/index_en.htm

27 April 2009

Delivering Credible Deterrence

Speech by Margaret Cole, Director of Enforcement, FSA
Annual Financial Crime Conference
27 April 2009

Good morning. It’s one of the occupational hazards of working in the Enforcement Division that we get to interview assorted fraudsters, con-men and insider dealers. So I found Professor Gill’s insights into the mind of the fraudster particularly interesting and I’ll make sure to feed these insights back to our investigation teams.

Last summer, at the FSA’s Enforcement Conference, in this very room, I set out our credible deterrence strategy. Today I want to remind you what credible deterrence is all about and update you on what we are doing to put it into operation. And I’ll be giving you some very tangible examples of the progress we’re making.

Credible deterrence is all about delivering outcomes that make a real difference to consumers and to markets. It means delivering results that make people sit up and pay attention. It’s about making people realise that they can suffer meaningful consequences if they break the law and if they don’t improve their standards of behaviour.

Delivering credible deterrence remains our focus in Enforcement and I don’t expect this to change any time soon. Our enforcement work is complemented by our supervisory strategy - an outcomes focused, intrusive, direct style of supervision. Last month our CEO, Hector Sants, spoke about credible deterrence and our intensive supervision model. He spoke of his determination to make people frightened of the FSA. Given my role at the FSA, you would expect me to share that determination – and I do. And I believe that our Enforcement team has the skill and determination to meet this challenge head on.

But this is not just a job for enforcement. We work with key strategic partners - many of whom are represented in this room. And we work with other areas of the FSA. Financial Crime and Intelligence, Markets and Enforcement work particularly closely on this joint venture. But delivering credible deterrence, and making people frightened of the FSA, is only a means to an end. That end is to change behaviour and we need to do that to fulfil our statutory objectives.

We want to change behaviour so that markets are clean, fair and orderly so that all investors can participate on a level playing field so that firms benefit from a low cost of equity and low transaction costs and so that investors and firms see London as a fair and dynamic financial centre.

And we also want to change behaviour so that retail customers get a fair deal, so that all firms, at all levels of the supply chain, treat their customers fairly, so that the man in the street can trust the financial services industry and so that criminals realise that attempting to defraud people involves high risks and offers minimal chances of reward.

I’m going to give you an overview of our progress in delivering credible deterrence and after that I’m going to focus on two areas of our credible deterrence agenda that are directly relevant to financial crime – these are our work to tackle insider dealing and market abuse where we are the lead prosecutor and our fight against share fraud.

Changing behaviour through credible deterrence is a long term strategy. The history, culture and traditions of financial services in the City stretch back to the late 17th century. The criminalisation of insider dealing is much more recent. More than 300,000 people are employed in financial services in London alone. Changing behaviour is not a walk in the park and we are realists, we do not expect overnight success. But we are determined to change behaviour using all the tools and levers available to us.

Over the last 12 months we’ve demonstrated that we’re willing to take on tough challenges and use all our powers – civil, criminal and administrative – to deliver our mandate.

Just last month, we secured a conviction in our first ever criminal insider dealing trial.

We challenged a Tribunal decision in the Court of Appeal for the first time, and achieved a resounding victory.

And last year, we imposed a record amount in financial penalties – over £27 million. We prohibited a record number of individuals. And we cancelled a record number of firms’ permissions.

Firsts and record results make good headlines. Those of you who follow the media coverage of Enforcement activity will have noticed a marked change in tone. Newspaper headlines such as “FSA gets tough” or “Financial watchdog shows its teeth” or “FSA hits insider trading” are typical of the tone of reporting on FSA Enforcement now, in marked contrast to a few years ago.

We are interested in results and headlines because of the demonstration effect. By getting these tough public outcomes, we are changing the perception of FSA as an enforcer.

We’ve made tangible progress in delivering credible deterrence. But expectations are higher than ever before and there are tough challenges ahead. Nowhere is this more true than in the first area I want to focus attention on today – tackling market abuse.

Insider dealing is a serious economic crime. And we aren’t the only ones to think that. Here are the words of Judge Testar, summing up at our recent insider dealing trial:

“This is not a victimless crime - this is a crime which does undermine confidence in the integrity of the market, and this is a confidence which is of great importance to the economic welfare of the community as a whole.

And he went to say:

“In addition, it does seem to me that the public are entitled to be angry if people who are in possession of inside information treat that position as a license to print a substantial amount of money.”

Less than a year ago, I appeared, with Hector Sants and our former Chairman Callum McCarthy, before the Treasury Select Committee. We were asked whether we felt that the City of London takes market abuse seriously enough. Our response was “no”. We took that opportunity to renew our commitment to get the City to take the subject more seriously.

That’s why we will continue with the plan we started around 3 years ago of bringing criminal prosecutions for insider dealing alongside civil actions for market abuse. Because we are determined that criminals in suits masquerading as city professionals will be seen for what they are – and will face serious consequences.

We want to create an environment where making a quick buck off the back of confidential information is seen as cheating, morally reprehensible and socially unacceptable and, most importantly, it’s a serious crime for which you can go to prison.

Eleven months on from the Treasury Select Committee I’m pleased to say that we’ve made real progress.

Last month, Christopher McQuoid, a solicitor, and his father-in-law, James Melbourne were found guilty of insider dealing. Both were sentenced to eight months imprisonment. McQuoid’s sentence began immediately and he is now behind bars.

The facts may appear straightforward to the casual observer:
  • McQuoid was the general counsel at TTP Communications.
  • In May 2006, he was told in confidence that Motorola was planning to take over the company.
  • Two days before the takeover was made public, his father-in-law,
  • Melbourne bought 153,824 TTP shares at 13 pence a share.
  • Melbourne had not dealt in any shares recently and he had never before bought TTP shares. On 1 June, the takeover was announced at an agreed share price of 45 pence.
  • As a result of the price increase, Melbourne made a profit of £48,919.20.
  • Three months later, Melbourne gave McQuoid a cheque for £24,459.60 – exactly half the profit made from the trade.
But insider dealing cases are notoriously tough to prosecute and there is no such thing as an easy win. These cases require careful and skilful investigation and preparation. We have demonstrated that we are prepared to commit the time and resource required and by achieving convictions and custodial sentences we believe we have sent a clear warning to others. McQuoid took advantage of the trust placed in him and has been found guilty of cheating the market. His punishment – an immediate custodial sentence – emphatically carries the message – this is serious criminal conduct.

The McQuoid/ Melbourne conviction resulted in considerable publicity, including a front page spread in the Independent under the headline Net tightens on insider trading. By raising the profile of insider dealing, by making it known that cheats will be punished, we are able to send a strong message.

But this case, our first insider dealing criminal prosecution to reach trial, is just the first step on this particular journey. There will be other prosecutions and more trials. You will understand that I am limited in what I can say about our pipeline cases. But it’s a matter of public record that we have three other criminal cases up and running. More will follow that are not yet in the public domain.

Our pipeline of cases include investigations into serious organised crime. We have made it a priority to tackle business professionals, repeat offenders and organised rings. We do also expect to pursue some cases of “opportunistic” abuse, especially where those involved are, because of their profession or role, committing a serious breach of trust.

In recent times we have also conducted some major searches and arrests targeting suspected organised insider dealing – including one last year and one in March this year. Investigations on these matters are ongoing. We have several large scale investigations under way at the moment. These matters take time. There is no guarantee of success and setbacks are inevitable. But that won’t deter us from the job we have to do. For me an important part of this is being proactive and being visible, being seen to be in the thick of the battle.

In parallel with our criminal investigations, we will use civil powers where appropriate. We will impose bigger financial penalties under the civil market abuse regime. Over the last year we imposed financial penalties on 10 individuals and 2 firms for market abuse. Earlier this year we fined Erik Boyen, a Belgian based private investor, £175,000, for dealing in shares on the basis of inside information. And we fined Darwin Clifton £60,000, and his company Byron Holdings Ltd £86,000, for dealing in shares on the basis of inside information.

And just last month, the Tribunal upheld our decision to impose our largest market abuse penalty to date on Winterflood Securities, a market-making firm. Winterflood and two of its traders had played a pivotal role in an illegal share ramping scheme which created a distortion in the market for over 6 months. Winterflood were fined £4 million and the individuals £200,000 and £50,000. We believe fines of this magnitude send a strong message to market participants.

The last year has also seen us improve our capacity to tackle market abuse. We obtained a significant increase to the Enforcement budget – allowing us to launch a recruitment campaign for additional lawyers and investigators. We have appointed David Kirk, formerly Director of the Fraud Prosecution Service, as our Chief Criminal Counsel. We have enhanced and expanded our Digital Evidence capacity. And the FSA has invested significant resources in our transaction surveillance capacity – SABRE 2. We have also been successful in our request to the government to get the power to grant statutory immunities – to incentivise less culpable parties to come forward and give evidence against those who have a greater part in the wrongdoing.

So as you can see we are in good shape to tackle the challenges we face.

The fight against market abuse is directly relevant to our statutory objective to promote clean, orderly and fair markets. I’m now going to move on to the focus of this afternoon’s session – consumer protection and share fraud – an area of financial crime directly relevant to our consumer protection objective.

Like market abuse, unauthorised business is a criminal offence. Like market abuse, it falls directly within our statutory objectives. Like market abuse, it’s a key priority for the FSA.

Share fraud is a serious financial crime and it has severe consequences for its victims. In economic terms, the average loss reported to the FSA is £20,000. Individual losses can be much higher. This is a crime that leaves people in debt and stripped of their savings for retirement. This is a crime that affects affluent, experienced investors but the elderly are also particularly vulnerable. My colleague, Chris Pond, will be speaking later today about our work, in partnership with Age Concern and Help the Aged, to protect older people from financial scams. We have seen instances where share fraud has led to human tragedy - to suicide, depression and divorce. The emotional impact cannot be overstated.

Estimating the size of share fraud in the UK is difficult. We have heard estimates that range from a few tens of millions of pounds, up to a billion pounds.

Although the total size of the problem remains unquantified, we do know that we’re seeing larger frauds than ever before. We have opened 5 investigations in the last few months, involving ponzi, deposit taking and property collective investment schemes. Consumer losses across the 5 cases could total £170m.

In the current economic environment, we might expect to continue to uncover more unauthorised business frauds. Because of this we have taken steps to improve our capacity to focus on this area. In the Enforcement Division we are in the process of doubling our number of unauthorised business teams and establishing a specialised Unauthorised Business Department. We are actively recruiting now.

Where we find a firm operating in the UK, or more commonly, a UK firm that is helping an overseas fraudster, we have a number of powers at our disposal. We will act swiftly to freeze assets and restrain activities by injunction. We will then move to wind that firm up using insolvency powers. And where we can, we will make individuals bankrupt. We will also use our criminal powers where appropriate to bring prosecutions.

In February 2008, we successfully prosecuted an unauthorised stockbroker, Robin Radclyffe. Radclyffe operated an illegal collective investment scheme, made false and misleading statements to his clients and caused losses of £350,000. As he was not authorised, victims were unable to make a claim on the Financial Services Compensation Scheme. Radclyffe was sentenced to 15 months imprisonment.

Earlier this year we won an appeal against Fox Hayes – a Leeds-based firm of solicitors that used its status as an FSA-authorised firm to approve promotional material used by overseas boiler room operations to defraud consumers. Fox Hayes approved financial promotions for unregulated overseas companies. The overseas companies used the promotional material to sell shares illegally to 60 UK investors for about 30 million US dollars.

The Court of Appeal found that Fox Hayes broke FSA rules and increased the level of penalty imposed by the Tribunal from £146,000 to £950,000. This was our first ever appeal from a Tribunal decision. It shows our determination to tackle financial crime and share fraud, and it shows that we are prepared to stick to our guns and remain bold and resolute to achieve credible deterrence.

The examples of Radclyffe and Fox Hayes send a strong deterrence message to any firm or individual involved in unauthorised business in the UK, or any firm or individual prepared to assist overseas fraudsters. We can and will take tough action. We will send people to prison. We will impose large financial penalties. We will pursue cases all the way in order to achieve the right regulatory outcome.

We have other tactics to tackle share fraud. We aim to educate consumers to reduce the possibility of fraud. A recent initiative emerged from a conference not unlike the one we’re having today. One of our managers met a Canadian regulator, who had recently conducted a search warrant and had uncovered a list of 11,500 UK shareholders – a so called ‘suckers’ list. We wrote to every shareholder listed warning them that they were in danger of share fraud and advising them on how to protect themselves.

Sometimes we can also secure consumer redress. Earlier this year we obtained a Court Order which meant that over £1m was returned to victims of a share scam.

Our increased resource will allow us to do more on deterring share fraudsters – it will allow us to take criminal action against UK based fraudsters and civil action against firms, such as Fox Hayes, who assist fraudsters. It will also allow us to do more on disruption and consumer education, and hopefully to return more money to victims.

But even with increased resource we can’t fight this battle on our own. We need the industry and our strategic partners to help us deliver credible deterrence. We work with City of London Police on Operation Archway – the national intelligence reporting system for share fraud. We work with banks to tighten up payment systems to provide an additional defence against share fraud. And we work with other key agencies, including the NFSA and the SFO, to ensure we have a joined up approach.

Sometimes the right approach is to encourage another prosecutor to take the lead and to support that prosecutor with our investigative work. That might very well be the case where the criminality we find goes wider than our direct remit. We very often hand cases over to the SFO or other agencies as the most important thing is to make sure the job gets done by the prosecuting authority best placed to do it.

The benefits of working collaboratively with other agencies can be seen in our work on mortgage fraud. We are not, and do not seek to be the responsible agency for prosecuting mortgage fraud. However, it has a serious impact on markets and on consumers and is directly relevant to our statutory objectives. Credible deterrence in this area is a shared responsibility. Mortgage lenders provide Financial Crime and Intelligence Division with intelligence on suspect brokers. We use our enforcement powers to investigate and take regulatory action – we’ve taken 40 people out of the market and issued fines totalling over half a million pounds over the last year. We have regular discussions with the police, we refer brokers to them and we co-operate and assist with their criminal investigations. By working together, we can deliver credible deterrence.

So, to conclude by returning to our overall aim and my messages for today. Credible deterrence is a means to an end. Making people frightened of the FSA is a means to an end. The end is to change behaviour so that markets are clean, fair and orderly and so that retail customers get a fair deal.

We recognise that changing behaviour will be difficult. But I firmly believe that we have the skills, bravery and resilience to succeed. We are visible in the arena and are ready for the challenges we face.

Finally, I would urge anyone who remains in doubt about how serious we are about this to look at the fate of McQuoid, Radcliffe or Fox Hayes and its Partners. Actions always speak louder than words and we are visibly demonstrating that the FSA means business.

Tackling financial crime in the current economic climate

Speech by Sally Dewar, Managing Director, Wholesale, FSA
Annual Financial Crime Conference
27 April 2009

Good morning ladies and gentlemen and let me echo Philip’s warm welcome to our annual financial crime conference.

As you will be aware, financial crime has been the subject of much political debate in recent weeks both in the UK and internationally with interest from G20, de Larosière, and the Sassoon Reports. Clearly we need to wait to see how these all play out – in the meantime, whilst much has been achieved, there is still much to do, and any change should seek to build on these achievements.

Going back five years, to an economy with much more benign conditions, where there was:
  • No co-ordinated strategy on fraud – a framework failing to effectively bring together the wide range of stakeholders involved in tackling financial crime;
  • A money laundering regime that placed heavy burdens on both firms and consumers;
  • A lack of infrastructure to co-ordinate public/private sector intelligence sharing; and
  • Legislation that made pursuing a criminal conviction for fraud near impossible.
5 years on and today much progress has been made:
  • We now have a national strategy on fraud – through the National Fraud Strategic Authority with a clearer understanding of priorities and where we need to focus our efforts to be most effective;
  • A record number of mortgage fraudsters – 40 in the last two years, have been taken out of the market and over half a million pound in fines issued;
  • The FSA has secured its first ever criminal conviction for insider dealing, with several more prosecutions in the pipeline;
  • We have in place a money laundering regime that is risk-based and proportionate;
  • 200,000 suspicious activity reports are received by SOCA every year – information which is utilised by numerous public organisations and law enforcement agencies; and
  • A simplified and more flexible Fraud Act which makes fraud easier to prosecute.
These are just some of the achievements in the last few years which have made the UK’s anti-financial crime regime much stronger. We believe that more can be done and it’s clear that it will require continued cooperation between a multitude of partners.

Today, I’d like to say a few opening remarks on the topics which you will hear more about as we go through the day. This sets out the FSA’s approach to tackling financial crime and how we can help you in the fight by focusing on four key themes, namely:
  • Our outcomes focused, risk based approach to financial crime;
  • What we see as some of the most serious financial crime risks as outlined in our Financial Risk Outlook;
  • Our credible deterrence strategy; and finally
  • Our programme of work to raise consumer awareness of financial crime, where today we have some very important messages to give you. This afternoon’s sessions are very much focused on the issues around consumer awareness.
Turning to the first of the key themes, I’d like to begin by outlining our regulatory approach to financial crime.

“If history teaches us one thing, it’s that history teaches us nothing”

This quote from Hegel, the German philosopher, sums up the cyclical nature of scandals that continue to rock the financial system to its very core. Barings, Worldcom and Enron through to SocGen, Satyam and Madoff today. We must learn from the past. In order to so, people must start to move away from the mindset of just doing enough to satisfy the regulators and to start thinking about the real financial crime risks to their businesses. An outcome-focused approach to financial crime means thinking about how your products, geographical locations and the culture within your organisation may create an outcome that facilitates fraudulent activity and then stopping that happening in a proportionate way. This is what we mean when we talk about ‘outcome focused’ regulation – judging firms on the outcomes and consequences of their actions not on the compliance with any given individual rule. It requires a fundamental shift in thinking that can only come from the top of the organisation, i.e. from firms’ senior management.

At the FSA we are very clear about the importance of reducing financial crime. It is one of our four statutory objectives which we are obliged by law to fulfil and it supports our other statutory objectives: to maintain confidence in the financial system and to educate, and protect consumers. Underpinning our regulatory approach is a risk-based framework, which recognises that we have a limited amount of resources and must focus our efforts on the issues which present the greatest risk to our statutory objectives.

One of the key tools in implementing this risk-based approach is our Financial Risk Outlook (or the FRO as we know it) which we publish at the beginning of every year. The aim of the FRO is to raise awareness of the main risks that we see facing firms, consumers and the regulatory system. It challenges us all to think carefully and critically about the potential threats ahead.

You probably won’t be surprised to learn that references to financial crime in this year’s FRO feature more frequently than last year. The link between declining economic conditions and crime has been well publicised. Given the unprecedented scale of the current financial crisis, the need to focus on financial crime is more relevant than ever. It presents firms with a host of new challenges around how the risks are changing and how firms’ anti-financial crime strategies need to be adapted as a consequence.

I’d like to turn then to these changing risks as we have set them out in our FRO, namely Fraud and Market Abuse.

Given current conditions, firms need to carefully consider: does my business have the capacity – both financially and reputationally – to prevent, detect or withstand a major corporate fraud?

In the last eighteen months there has been an abundance of headlines dedicated to this area, which should give us some clue as to fraud’s direction of travel:
  • The UK cards association (formerly APACS) – tell us that overall card fraud losses were up nearly 14% last year; and
  • CIFAS – the UK's Fraud Prevention Service – have gathered data from their members that shows an overall 16% increase in the growth in fraud, compared to 2007.
Within these figures are some worrying trends that firms need to consider. For example, if you look at the specific types of fraud contained in the CIFAS figures there has been a 200% escalation in ‘account takeover’ fraud. This happens where a fraudster takes over a legitimate account of the victim. The increase could be down to fraudsters changing their methods because it is getting harder to obtain credit from providers. It is a clear sign of the thriving black market for stolen personal data – ID fraud costs the country £1.7 billion a year and has directly affected at least six million Britons, according to government figures.

Developments in technology have undoubtedly been fundamental in allowing innovation and growth in the financial services industry. However, those same developments are being exploited by criminals to allow easier and faster access to valuable personal data.

Online banking is one example of technology providing cost savings and convenience to consumers and the industry – the fact that over a third of the adult population now bank online is testament to this. And yet the UK Cards Association reports an alarming 132% increase in online banking fraud last year. Abuse of the financial system in this way threatens to undermine consumer confidence and so it is vital that we recognise the warning signs and take action.

You might expect current economic conditions to have reduced opportunities for fraud because of tighter lending criteria, for example and a dwindling supply of credit. However, successful application fraud continues to rise as criminals play the system by, for example, avoiding declaring adverse credit history. So we know that they don’t stand still – they constantly look to test for weak links in the chain and your business can quickly become known as an easy target for criminals if it does not keep up to speed.

In some cases we know that economic conditions have reduced opportunities for crime, for example, mortgage fraud. Tough times lead companies to scrutinise their assets and cash flow more carefully and in doing so, they will discover frauds that took place many years before, during the good times. This is what we’re seeing with mortgage fraud at the current time as a string of cases are coming to light.

Current conditions present us with a unique opportunity: to prepare for the future by tackling weak practices now and to clear up the debris of the past. The incidence may have reduced for the moment, but it’s certainly not going away. Evidence suggests that new mortgage fraud continues to be perpetrated – recently we have worked with police forces on some very troubling cases involving mortgage brokers stealing mortgage advances from their own customers. So, there is clearly more work to do in this area.

The threat of attack can come from within your business as much as it can externally. Data gathered from the CIFAS’ staff fraud database tells us that insider fraud is on the increase. In the last six months, cases of proven staff fraud reported by CIFAS’ members have increased by 40%. Interestingly, only 2% of cases are reported through staff whistleblowing channels, which raise some important questions about the anti-fraud culture within firms. By sharing this data, CIFAS members have been able to prevent suspected fraudsters from re-entering the industry. Intelligence-sharing in this way has proven benefits, so why then aren’t all firms signed up to it?

You will hear later from Dr Bernard Herden about the National Fraud Strategic Authority’s work to develop a co-ordinated strategy for tackling fraud and make the UK a more hostile place for fraudsters.

Market abuse and insider dealing are other unwanted side effects where a failure to provide the right incentives and controls can encourage employees to commit criminal acts. As I said at the start of this speech, the FSA has a specific remit for maintaining confidence in the financial system We’ve seen the destabilising effects that market abuse can have on the financial system and, far from being a victimless crime, for every person who gains as a result of market abuse, others have to lose out. Put into perspective, that’s the pensions and investment funds of all of us.

Next Professor Martin Gill will speak about how changing personal circumstances can motivate otherwise honest people to commit financial crime. Understanding the motivations and where the risks lie is a first step towards shoring up defences and we hope that this information will help firms to be alert to the risks and reinforce their defences.

Firms are clearly under pressure to generate new income streams, however, this poses a risk that firms may engage with markets that pose a higher financial crime threat. Even in the UK, failure to know exactly who you’re doing business with could lead to legal risk, for example, around financial sanctions. To help firms in meeting their obligations, today we have published on our website a report on firms’ systems and controls in relation to the sanctions regime and I would strongly encourage all firms to review the examples of good and poor practice contained within in it.

It is crucial that even in an economic downturn such as what we’re now experiencing, firms continue to focus on operational risks to their business, including financial crime. We recognise that firms are under increased pressure to rationalise and to cut costs and so the challenge for you is to demonstrate to us that you are continuing to deliver the same outcomes.

We’ll hear more from the Panel this morning on this subject, however, I would like to add one key point. It’s generally recognised that wholesale change is required at a global level to address the current issues in the financial markets and I believe that a wholesale cultural change is necessary to strengthen our industry from financial crime. A cultural change away from the view of financial crime as ‘white collar’ and ‘victimless’.

I’d like to turn to the third of my key themes in this speech, which is our commitment to deliver credible deterrence.

Our message to potential wrongdoers is clear. If they engage in financial crime then they must realise that they can, and will, be held to account for their actions. And that there will be serious consequences.

There is a collective determination within the FSA to deliver on this promise. You will have already started to see this new philosophy bear fruit – with one criminal conviction for insider dealing already this year and several others cases in the pipeline. You’ll be hearing more on this from Margaret Cole later this morning.

This is an example of the FSA delivering on our obligations where we have the lead responsibility. It is important for us that we are clear about where the boundaries lie. Our focus is on delivering credible deterrence in respect of the obligations given to us under the Financial Services & Markets Act. This means taking action in relation to market-related offences and issues relating to unauthorised activities such as share sale frauds (sometimes known as Boiler rooms).

It is important to note that we are not, and do not seek to be, the responsible agency for prosecuting financial fraud in its ‘conventional’ or wider sense. This responsibility is shared elsewhere, for example, by law enforcement and other prosecutors. When we suspect such crimes in firms that we regulate, we can and do refer them to the relevant prosecutors. Credible deterrence in this area is a shared responsibility, so where we are not in a position to take direct action to prosecute offenders we will progress our agenda through our partners, by providing intelligence and facilitating the flow of information.

It is a strategy that is delivering real and tangible benefits. In July last year Philip Robinson outlined a programme of work the FSA is undertaking to tackle mortgage fraud – a programme that recognises the breadth of stakeholders involved in tackling this issue and is founded on intelligence sharing. Since calling on firms to participate in our voluntary ‘Information from lenders’ project, to provide us with intelligence on suspect brokers and other market participants, we’ve seen a 25% increase in the number of reports provided to us. We’ve taken people out of the market and issued fines totalling over half a million pounds for direct involvement in mortgage fraud We have regular discussions with police forces to co-operate with their criminal investigations, and we refer banned mortgage brokers to them with a view to seizing their assets and convicting them.

Credible deterrence is complemented by our more intrusive supervisory strategy. It is vital for firms and for market confidence that our institutions are soundly run by individuals who can clearly demonstrate that they have the necessary skills, experience and integrity. We have already started to interview more applicants for ‘significant influence’ posts at high impact firms and we will take action against those who fail to achieve the standards we expect. Towards the end of last year, for example, we fined the MLRO of Sindicatum Holdings £17,500 for failing to adequately oversee and implement AML controls. And the fitness and propriety of owners, managers or controllers of regulated firms continues to be a key focus for us.

Turning now to my final theme today, I’d like to talk about our programme of work to raise consumer awareness of financial crime, and give you some details of a very important partnership being unveiled today.

As a result of the rapid movement of the internet into our homes, mobile phones and televisions, there have never been so many opportunities to access fraud prevention information. And yet the number of victims continues to rise.

Fraudsters are using the current economic conditions to their advantage. With interest rates at a record low, some people will be looking for investments that will give them generous returns which out perform the market. This is how ‘boiler rooms’ or ‘share sale frauds’ operate so successfully and you will hear more from Margaret on our work, domestically and internationally, to tackle this specific problem later.

There is also the example of an organised crime scheme which SOCA brought down this month which highlights some of the techniques fraudsters use. It’s a familiar one to us all – a bogus notice that ‘you’ve won the lottery’ in a foreign country that you don’t remember entering. The victims only lose small amounts of money each, twenty pounds, which is small enough not to warrant reporting it, and of course there is the embarrassment the victim feels about having to do so. It could have netted the fraudsters £35m per year – this is money that could be used to fund other crimes. So there’s a serious social cost that means action is needed. And, mindful of our ‘public understanding’ objective, we need to find ways to help people overcome their attitudes to financial crime; to find a way to communicate with them, and to encourage them to engage with the problem and with those who can help them.

You’ll hear this afternoon from Chris Pond, Director of our Financial Capability programme, about the FSA’s response to this problem and the work we are undertaking to educate consumers.

The programme aims to develop capable, confident consumers who are better equipped to take responsibility for the vast array of financial decisions facing them today. However, we only have a finite amount of resources between us and so the first step, as an evidence-based regulator, is to find out where the problem areas lie. We ran a survey of consumers prior to this conference to enable us gauge current awareness levels of financial crime and whether people feel there is enough information out there to help them avoid becoming a victim. We will publish the findings of this survey today. Our survey found that 35% of individuals targeted by share fraudsters last year were over 65. In addition, 49% of the over 65’s believe that there isn’t enough information on how to protect themselves from fraud. The statistics from the City of London Police on boiler room victims, published last week, reinforces this view. Chris will talk more about this survey and its findings this afternoon.

Criminals use increasingly sophisticated techniques to target vulnerable people and they adapt to changing conditions - some even using the recent mergers of financial firms as a hook to confuse people into giving out personal details. And it is increasingly difficult to spot a scam ‘phishing’ email from a genuine one. This means we need to get smarter about engaging with those vulnerable groups and in doing so we must widen our reach and bring relevant experts within the scope of the anti-fraud community.

In that context then I am very pleased to announce today our new partnership with Age Concern and Help the Aged, to help protect older people and to welcome Jane Vass from Age Concern with us today to share her thoughts on what more we can do to help to tackle this problem.

In closing, I’d like to summarise the key points for you take away from this speech:
  • Financial crime continues to remain a key priority for the FSA and it should be for your firm too. It is vital that firms continue to focus on strengthening their controls around operational risks mentioned in our FRO document, including financial crime.
  • We will continue to help firms, by reviewing industry practices and highlighting areas of good and poor practice so that firms can benchmark their own controls. As well as our FRO, I would encourage you to read our regular Financial Crime Newsletters and note any Financial Crime speeches we give – all available on our website.
  • We will pursue our ‘credible deterrence’ agenda by taking action ourselves where we have the lead responsibility and through our key partners where we don’t.
  • Partnership working and information sharing such as what we are announcing today in respect of Age Concern and Help the Aged, is key to staying one step ahead of the fraudsters and we must work more effectively together in certain areas, particularly in raising consumer awareness of financial crime.
There has been, and no doubt will continue to be, much debate about the most effective way to reduce financial crime. We shouldn’t let that distract us from the goal of working together to tackle it. Today, the priority must be for all of us involved in the fight against financial crime to exchange ideas on how we can work together more effectively and to stay one step ahead of those who would seek to defraud society. In turbulent and changing times it is crucial that we remain focused. The number and breadth of interests of the people gathered here today should give us heart that we do remain as committed as ever to achieving that goal.

We are lucky to have such high quality speakers here today. I wish you all an enjoyable and informative day.

Thank you.

Current issues affecting the OTC derivatives Market and its importance to London

The Over the Counter (OTC) Derivatives market is a global market and needs global Central Counter Parties (CCPs). Thus the US and European Commission should not try to create Regional CCPs for Over the Counter (OTC) derivatives, according to a new report from Bourse Consult, published by the City of London Corporation today.

The report examines the scale and scope of the OTC derivatives industry, its role in the financial crisis and its importance to London's financial centre. London has 43% of the global OTC derivatives market by value, whilst the US has 24%.

The report suggests that Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs) on Asset Backed Securities (ABS), sold into highly leveraged Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) and held off banks’ balance sheets, were the major “guilty parties” in the financial crisis. The report finds little evidence that Credit Default Swaps (CDS) - which were traded far more widely than CDOs - contributed significantly to the crisis.

The report concludes by making recommendations for future regulation of the OTC derivatives market in the US and European Union.

Download OTC Derivatives Report (712kb)

FSA chairman expands on themes from Turner Review

Lord Turner, chairman of the Financial Services Authority (FSA), said today that the potential macroeconomic costs of tighter regulation for banks had to be set against the benefits of lower risk to financial stability.

In a speech at the Global Financial Forum in New York, he expanded on three themes from his recent review of banking regulation.

Lord Turner said:

"A major objective must be to return banking to its basic functions – providing vital services of real value to the real economy. And a major lesson of the crisis is that that we cannot rely on market discipline alone or even primarily to achieve this, or to ensure that financial instability risks are contained, but must use robust regulation.

"The required reform is multifaceted. But three elements of reform are particularly important: a macro-prudential approach, major changes to capital adequacy regulation and major changes in the regulation of liquidity."

He told the conference that in designing a new global framework for the regulation of banking there was significant agreement, but also areas with no clear answers yet, including:
  • How to balance any possible costs of higher capital and liquidity requirements against greater systemic stability;
  • Whether banks that are "too big to fail" may be expected to hold extra capital; and
  • The possibility of cross-border banks facing more onerous local liquidity and capital arrangements.
In conclusion, Lord Turner said:

"We need to design a banking system and credit intermediation system focused on its core and essential functions in the real economy and better able to be a shock absorber rather than itself a source of instability."

Building a more stable global banking system

Speech by Adair Turner, Chairman, FSA
Global Financial Forum, New York
27 April 2009

The global financial system has suffered a huge crisis. Certainly the worst for 70 years: in some ways, in its international reach and impact, the worst in the entire history of modern capitalism. And this financial crisis – largely the product of developments within the financial system, not events imposed from without – has generated a severe global recession.

One of the striking features of this financial crisis and of the severe global recession which it has caused is how much they have surprised us, how poor we have been at foreseeing even the short-term future.

With a few noteworthy and commendable exceptions, most apparent experts – central bankers, regulators, treasury officials, academic economists and bankers themselves – did not recognise, in the boom years up to 2007, that we were heading for disaster. Indeed the record is full of expert speeches explaining how financial innovation had dispersed the holding of credit risks and increased financial resilience.

But what is perhaps more surprising is how poor was our predictive ability even once we were a year into the financial crisis, in summer and autumn 2008.
  • Very few foresaw in early September 2008 that between 15 September and 10 October the global money market would seize up almost completely, forcing major banks across the world to rely on central bank liquidity support and government recapitalisation for survival. The world seemed to change in four weeks.
  • Most of us have been surprised how long it has taken to restore confidence in the global banking system given the huge public interventions and the clear commitment, confirmed by action, that after Lehman Brothers no other systemically important bank or investment bank will be allowed to fail.
  • And most experts did not, even in October, foresee the severity of the global recession. The IMF World Economic Outlook of October 2008 was still forecasting 3% global growth in 2009 and a return to 4.7% to 2010: the latest forecast is a global contraction of 1.3% in 2009 and global growth of 1.9% in 20101. In October Japan was still anticipated to grow 0.5% in 2009: the forecast is now a contraction of 6.25%2. We knew that the financial crisis would hit economies with large financial sectors, but most experts did not anticipate, even six months ago, how big the impact would be on global trade and on manufacturing demand and output.
The crisis has therefore brutally illustrated two facts which we should always have known, but which were easy to ignore in what seemed like the golden years of the Great Moderation.
  • First that banking systems, because they perform maturity transformation – lending long and borrowing short – depend crucially on confidence in banks and between banks, which if lost can take a long time to recover. And that the most important risks in banking are systemic not idiosyncratic: illiquidity in one bank or securitised credit market having potential impacts on the behaviour and liquidity of others, lack of confidence in one bank or securitised credit market potentially draining confidence and liquidity from others.
  • And second, that if the banking system is impaired huge economic loss can result. Ben Bernanke’s ‘Essays on the Great Depression’ illustrates the pivotal role that banking system failure played, alongside the collapse in nominal demand, in creating the Great Depression.3 Recent IMF research illustrates that recessions which followed banking crisis were on average much deeper and longer lasting than those where banking failure was absent.4 And the historic lessons from crises, focused on classic on-balance sheet banking, apply perhaps even more so in a system characterised by a significant role for securitised credit. The potential for irrational exuberance and then irrational despair is inherent in all financial markets, rooted in collective action problems, principal agent relationships, and human psychology. But whereas the market economy seems able to absorb without too great harm a boom and bust in, for instance, a large element of the equity market – e.g. the internet boom of 1996 to 2001 – irrational exuberance and then reversal in the price of securitised credit held on the trading books of banks is far more disruptive.
Those lessons carry major implications for the future regulation of the banking and credit intermediation system.

The crisis faces us with two key challenges:
  • how best to manage the macro economy in the short term, minimising the scale and depth of the recession; and
  • how to create a more robust banking system for the future.
The answer to the first lies partly in macroeconomic policy, action to maintain nominal demand through fiscal policy, classic monetary policy and if necessary quantitative easing. It also requires action to accelerate the return to health of the banking system, where by health we mean not just the absence of failure, but the ability to extend sufficient credit to the real economy. That has required a mix of recapitalisation, funding guarantees and tail risk insurance, informed by stress tests which deliberately consider future scenarios more severe than we expect to arise. The purpose of stress tests indeed is to inform policy decisions on bank support packages which ensure that the stress scenario never in fact occurs.

But it is not on the short-term challenge that I will focus this morning, but on the regulation and possible shape of the future banking system.

Soon after I took over as the Chairman of the FSA in September last year, the UK’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, Alistair Darling, asked me to produce a review which would assess the causes of the financial crisis and make recommendations for future regulatory reform.

That review (‘The Turner Review: A regulatory response to the global banking crisis’ was published on 18 March). It begins with an analysis of what went wrong. The factors include:
  • the rapid growth since the mid 1990s of a complex variant of the securitised credit intermediation model, with much of the risk retained on the trading books of banks and bank-like institutions, rather than truly distributed to end investors;
  • the growth of leverage in institutions and embedded in products;
  • the growth of a shadow banking system – investment banks, mutual funds and off balance sheet vehicles – performing credit intermediation and maturity transformation functions but not subject to adequate capital and liquidity constraints;
  • over reliance on apparently sophisticated mathematical techniques for analysing and controlling risk; and
  • a classic cycle of irrational exuberance and then reversal.
Those factors help define what we need to put right for the future. But it is also important, in designing a future approach, to recognise two underlying lessons:
  • first, that not all innovation is equally socially useful and that financial innovation can be used, and was extensively used in the run-up to the crisis, to extract economic rents rather than to deliver services of real value to the real economy; and
  • second, that market discipline failed, with neither bank equity nor bank CDS prices providing any indication of approaching disaster, and with shareholders providing little effective restraint on excessive risk-taking.
Looking forward this implies that a major objective must be to return banking to its basic functions – providing vital services of real value to the real economy. And that we cannot rely on market discipline alone or even primarily to achieve this, or to ensure that financial instability risks are contained, but must use robust regulation.

The required reform is multifaceted, and I have limited time this morning. But three elements of reform are particularly important: a macro-prudential approach, major changes to capital adequacy regulation, and major changes in the regulation of liquidity.

So I will comment on these, and then consider three issues arising where, while we know the direction of travel, there are complex issues to be considered and important trade-offs to be made.

A macro-prudential approach

First then, the need for a macro-prudential approach, focusing on whole system risks, rather than only on risks at the individual institution level. It has now been said by so many people, in so many speeches and reports, that it’s in danger of becoming a cliché. But it is vital. The FSA has been criticised for having failed to spot emerging problems in specific institutions, and in particular in the mortgage bank Northern Rock, in the years running up to 2007. And we have recognised that some criticism was valid and taken steps to reform our supervisory process. But the blunt fact is that even if we had had a better supervisory process in place, it would have made only a small difference to the evolution of the financial crisis in the UK. The far bigger failure, shared with regulators and central banks across the world, was our inability to see that the growth of the system of complex securitised credit intermediation, changing patterns of maturity transformation, and rapid cross-economy credit growth, in the UK and globally, had created huge systemic risk.

We need in future, at national and global level, to analyse trends in credit growth, in whole system maturity transformation, in institutional and product embedded leverage, and in the inter-linkages between different parts of the financial system, bank and near bank. We need to identify emerging risks and ensure that these are addressed by system-wide prudential tools which can help ‘take away the punch bowl before the party gets out of hand’ rather than relying solely on monetary policy to achieve that end.

Countercyclical capital and accounting

There are several such potential tools. But a clear priority is a countercyclical capital adequacy regime, requiring banks to build up capital in good times, both in order to constrain excessive growth in the upswing and to provide buffers which can be drawn on in the downswing. Two key issues then arise:
  • Should that countercyclical requirement be discretionary, reflecting evolving macro-prudential analysis, or should it be hardwired through some formula, such as in the Spanish dynamic provisioning system? The FSA believes that there may be a role for a discretionary element, but that it needs to be underpinned by the discipline of an automatic formula. Once the memory of this crisis has faded, there will again come times when the judgements of regulators are seen as tiresome impediments to innovation and growth and when financial institutions will argue and lobby against what they see as unnecessary constraints. We cannot rely solely on our permanent ability to resist such arguments and to stand against the conventional wisdom of the time: we need to hardwire some countercyclicality.
  • And should countercyclicality be reflected also in published accounts? We believe it should: that alongside but separate from the accounting lines we have now – the fair value lines for trading books, and the impairment provisions for banking books – we need a forward-looking Economic Cycle Reserve, concentrating management and investors’ attention on the inherently cyclical nature of banking risks. Banks are different: and accounting for banks needs to reflect that fact.
More capital – especially against trading books

In addition to countercyclical capital, however, we also need more capital in total across the banking system, and in particular more capital against trading book risk, where the existing regime has proved wholly inadequate. The Basel Committee has already proposed changes which by the end of 2010 will very significantly increase trading book capital requirements – the impact on some categories of activity could be as much as three times as much capital required as today. But we also need a fundamental review of how we think about trading risk. We know that Value at Risk (VAR) measures, widely applied and praised as mathematically precise measures of risk, are potentially pro-cyclical and at times deeply inadequate, particularly in periods of systemic stress. But we have a lot of work to define a better technique, or most likely techniques (plural), for I suspect that the key to progress will be to recognise the different risks which arise in different categories of trading activity, and the way in which risks depend on the inter-relationship between the characteristics of the assets and the characteristics of the funding.

Major reforms to liquidity policy

Thirdly, we need major changes and a dramatically increased focus on liquidity. Changing techniques and patterns of maturity transformation played a key role in the origins of the crisis. Many banks, particularly some in the UK, placed increase reliance on funding via wholesale interbank markets. But in addition, maturity transformation was increasingly performed not on bank balance sheets, but by non-banks and off-balance-sheet vehicles – investment banks, mutual funds, SIVs. And hugely increased reliance was placed on liquidity through marketability – the idea that it was safe to fund contractually long-term assets with short term repo finance, because the assets could always be sold when needed.

These changes were profound, but regulators and central banks across the world failed to appreciate that fact. Bluntly we took our eye off the ball on liquidity, while directing a huge intellectual effort to the complexity of Basel 2 banking book capital reform. Liquidity regulation needs to return to centre stage, a key focus both of individual firm supervision and of macro-prudential analytical attention.

The FSA is therefore already committed to introducing new liquidity regulations which will require larger buffers of high quality clearly liquid assets, and which will create incentives for banks to extend the tenor of their liabilities, placing less reliance on short term wholesale deposits. The result will be less maturity transformation in each individual bank and less maturity transformation across the whole system, and thus lower total system liquidity risks.

So three core changes: a macro-prudential approach, more capital and countercyclical capital, and more effective liquidity regulation. There is very significant global agreement on this agenda. But there are many details of implementation to be worked out, and some areas where we don’t yet have clear answers, where more reflection is required.

I’d like to highlight three in particular:
  • How much more capital; how tight liquidity constraints?
  • How to deal with large complex banks?
  • How to deal with large cross-border banks?
How much more capital; how tight liquidity constraints?

It is generally agreed that we need more capital across the global banking system and higher quality capital, in particular more common equity. But the question then is how much more? What are optimal banking system capital ratios? What is perhaps surprising is how little that has been debated over the last ten to fifteen years of intense global debate about the details of bank capital adequacy regimes. In designing the Basel 2 regime we have considered in detail the relative capital treatment of different categories of risk, but we have proceeded on the assumption that total aggregate capital across the banking system should remain roughly what it was before.

We now need, as we design a new long-term system, to address the fundamental issue we have previously avoided. That requires addressing some complex theoretical issues:
  • the advantage of more capital is that it will increase the resilience of the system, thereby reducing the likelihood of banking crises and the harm that they cause5;
  • the apparent disadvantage, at first sight, is that higher capital requirements will increase the costs of the banking system and thus the costs to the real economy of credits intermediation. But if the Modigliani and Miller theorem holds, the required additional quantity of capital is offset, at least partially, by the lower risk and thus lower cost of equity capital.
A crucial issue to consider is therefore whether higher capital requirements do impose a long-term macroeconomic cost, and if so how large. Any such impact would then need to be traded off versus the stability benefits of a more highly capitalised banking system: a trade-off between a slight decrease in the long-term sustainable growth rate, and the harm done by periodic setbacks to growth of the sort we are now suffering.

Having just learned how harmful instability can be, we should rationally shift the trade-off towards greater stability. The direction of change should therefore clearly be towards a banking system which has higher equity capital, lower returns on equity capital, but also lower risk: a more boring investment, but the safer one. But how far we need to go in that direction needs careful thought.

Similarly in relation to liquidity. If in order to have a more stable system we need, both at the individual bank level and the total system level, to limit the degree of maturity transformation, i.e. to limit more than in the recent past the extent to which individual banks and total system are able to lend long but borrow short, there must in theory be an economic cost. This cost would arise from a change in the term structure of interest rates. If the banks have to hold more short-term assets, and fund with somewhat longer tenor liabilities, than long-term interest rates should marginally increase relative to short term in order to induce the non-bank sector to hold the converse position. This slight rise in long-term interest rates would in theory be marginally less favourable to long-term investment.

In theory therefore we have the same trade-off as with capital. Tighter control of liquidity may have a marginal negative impact on long-term investment and thus growth, but deliver the benefit of reduced instability, and thus a reduced likelihood of the major harm to medium-term growth and human welfare which we are now seeing. And, as I argued above in relation to capital requirements, the events of the last two years, which have revealed how huge the costs of instability can be, should logically lead us to put more weight on the avoidance of instability, even at some slight long-term cost. But how much we shift the trade-off deserves careful thought. And in our macro-prudential analysis, we need to develop much better understanding than we have had in the past, of the overall degree and nature of maturity transformation in the banking and near banking system, and how the aggregate extent of maturity transformation, and the mechanisms through which it is being achieved, are evolving over time.

How to deal with large complex banks?

The second open issue is how to deal with large complex banks. The problem is clear. In the run-up to this crisis, several large commercial banks, which perform basic banking functions for companies and households, and whose retail deposits are insured, were extensively involved in risky propriety trading, which generated large bonuses for individual bankers but produced large losses which taxpayers have had to underwrite. How then should we deal with ‘too-big-to-fail’ banks? And with banks which span classic banking and investment banking activities?

One proposition sometimes out forward is that we should make it clear that there is no ‘too-big-to-fail’ category, and that if we define well in advance how we would resolve rather than support even the very largest banks, imposing suitable haircuts on non-insured bondholders and creditors, we could usefully reintroduce market discipline into the system. But there would be huge problems with such an approach: resolution rather than support of a large complex bank will always be incredibly difficult to achieve without serious knock-on effects. And, as I describe in my Review, market discipline is often ineffective: after all, equity shareholders, who quite rightly can suffer huge losses if a bank gets into trouble and who knew that in advance of the crisis, were not at all effective in disciplining management action prior to 2007. I suspect we simply have to accept that there is a ‘too-big-to-fail’ and ‘too-connected-to-fail’ category, and accept that the primary discipline on excessive risk-taking by this category comes through regulation rather than market discipline. A crucial objective of effective regulation is therefore to protect taxpayers against the costs that they will inevitably have to bear if a large systemically important bank does get into trouble.

Another proposed way forward is to force a separation of classic narrow banking from risky investment banking activities (or as some would have it ‘casino banking’ activities) reimposing a Glass-Steagall type distinction, and to make it clear that institutions on the risky side of the fence are on their own when in trouble. The objective is in principle attractive, but for reasons set out in my Review, it is not clear that it would effectively address the problem, or that a clear and appropriate division of functions is practical in today’s complex and global economy. It is certainly not the case that we can simply leave to market discipline institutions on the risky side of the fence: Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers were not banks and did not enjoy the benefit of insured deposit funding, but they turned out to be systemically important. And narrow banks doing classic commercial banking can get into trouble as much as universal or investment banks doing risky trading – Indy Mac, Washington Mutual, and Northern Rock were all narrow banks: HBOS’s problems almost entirely stemmed from classic banking activities.

For those reasons my Review did not suggest a new Glass-Steagall type legal distinction, but rather the imposition of new capital and liquidity regimes for trading activity. The clear objective and likely impact of such regimes would, however, be very similar to those which a Glass Steagall type separation would attempt to achieve:
  • it would almost certainly result in an increasing number of banks choosing to focus entirely on classic commercial banking activities; and
  • it would help ensure that where commercial banks are significantly involved in trading and market making activities, they should and will be doing so as a means of providing necessary services to commercial customers, rather than a standalone activity.
My judgement is that that should be the way forward, and that in a world where many countries never had a Glass-Steagall divide, it will be. But if we are to go down this route, rather than a more hard and fast legal divide, we certainly need to make sure that those trading book capital and liquidity regimes are effective and effectively applied.

And we should I believe be open minded to a third potential way forward, which I did not address in The Turner Review, but which has been proposed by others, which is that large systemically important ‘too-big-to-fail’ banks should have to maintain higher capital ratios than applied on average. There would of course be implementation difficulties in such a strategy. It would require the definition of which banks are systemically important and too-big-to-fail, somewhat reducing the flexibility of the authorities to respond to the particular circumstances which might pertain in future periods of financial stress. But is certainly a possible way forward and should be evaluated alongside work on the details of the capital and liquidity regimes.


How to deal with large cross-border banks?

That evaluation also needs to cover the specific issues of large cross-border banks, banks with large operations in many countries and which in some cases are very large relative to the size of their home country. The crisis and in particular the failure of Lehman Brothers has revealed what in the Review I describe as fault lines in the regulation and supervision of cross-border banks. The essence of the problem, as Mervyn King has elegantly put it, is that global banks are global in life, but in death or rescue from death they are national. Decisions about fiscal and central bank support are ultimately made by home country national authorities focusing on national rather than global considerations, and in failure specific legal entities and national specific bankruptcy procedures have major implications for creditors.

We should offset these problems as much as possible via increase global coordination – through the effective operation of global colleges of supervisors, and through the development of cross-border crisis coordination plans – both major priorities of the Financial Stability Forum (now the Financial Stability Board) and strongly supported by the FSA. But we must recognise the limitations of what we can achieve by improved coordination. Until and unless we have a global government deploying global fiscal resources to support banks if global supervision is ineffective – something I do not anticipate seeing in my lifetime – the solvency and liquidity of specific national legal entities will matter. The direction of change is therefore inevitably going to be towards national authorities demanding that the local operations of global banks are separately and strongly capitalised, and that ring-fenced liquidity is held at individual national entity level. Pursued to the limit, this would make global banks increasingly like holding groups of individual national banks, rather than single integrated businesses.

That of course raises concerns among major international banks. They would like to be able to manage their capital and liquidity on as global a basis as possible, and argue that national ring fencing of capital and liquidity increases total cost of operation. That in turn, it may be argued, might have consequences for the ability of global banks to play their role in lubricating the flows of capital and trade which are vital to a successful global economy. We need to understand whether and to what extent and in what circumstances this is a valid argument.

This is of course a subset of the theoretical issue I posed above: when we require the banking system to hold more capital, or more liquidity, what consequences follow for macroeconomic performance, for long-term investment and growth. We need to answer that in general and specifically as it relates to cross-border banks required to hold capital and liquidity at local level. I don’t think that today we have certain answers to either question; detailed reflection and analysis is required.

But it is important to be clear what the question is: it cannot be simply, ‘would tighter capital and liquidity constraints, imposed at group level as well as a national entity level have hassle factor consequences and cost base consequences for individual global banks?’: obviously they would. It has to be ‘what are the macroeconomic consequences of these constraints and how should any implications for long-term investment and growth be traded-off against the benefits of greater stability?’.

And, overall, the value of financial stability needs to be central to our deliberations. The cost of the recession we now face – in lost output, in postponed investment, and in the human welfare of individuals affected by unemployment and sudden losses in wealth – will be huge. Any benefits of the wave of complex financial innovation we have been through would have had to be very large to outweigh these costs. But it is unclear that that wave of financial innovation could ever have delivered significant benefits even if it had not also created major instability. Looking forward, as Ben Bernanke recently argued, we must not assume that all financial innovation is valueless: clearly it can sometimes deliver real economic benefit. But we need to recognise that not all innovation is useful: and we need to recognise that financial stability is hugely important. We need to design a banking system and credit intermediation system focused on its core and essential functions in the real economy and better able to be a shock absorber rather than itself a source of instability.

Footnotes
  1. IMF World Economic Outlook, Crisis and Recovery, April 2009
  2. IMF World Economic Outlook, Crisis and Recovery, April 2009
  3. Ben Bernanke ‘Essays on the Great Depression’ , Chapter 2 ‘Non monetary effects of the financial crisis’
  4. IMF World Economic Outlook , October 2008
  5. A key insight of the Modigliani and Miller theorem is that the average cost of capital (meaning in this sense all equity and debt finance and not simply ‘capital’ as we define it in the context of bank regulation) should be unaffected by leverage in the absence of corporate taxes, but that corporate taxes can introduce an incentive for a firm (whether a non-bank or a bank) to increase leverage and minimise equity funding. It should be noted, however, that since taxes are received by the government, increased bank equity requirements might not have a social cost even if they have a private cost of capital impact. And it would be possible to combine increased capital requirements on banks with changes to taxation approaches which brought social optimality and private incentive into closer alignment.